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The Universal in Physics I 1

The opening paragraph of the Physics sketches succinctly Aristotle's
general notion of scientific knowledge.
First, in fny scientific discipline, to
Secondly, the natural path
know a thing is to know its principles or elements.
of human knowledge is from thing� that are more knowable for men to things that
are more knowable in themselves, that is, from concretions to the distinct cognition
of principles and elements.
These two norms are regarded as applying to all
scientific procedure. Here they are outlined briefly as an introduction to the
Aristotelian philosophy of nature.
Up to this point the opening chapter of the treatise is recapitulating standard
Arietotelianism in quite the expected way.
According to the Stagirite's general
noetic, the origin of human knowledge lies inevitably in sensible things. Sensible
things are. i�mediately apparent to a man's cognition.
From knowledge of the �
in consequence, all further human knowledge is in one way or another derived .;> All
sensible things, moreover, are concretions.
They are composites both in reality
and from the viewpoint of the logician. In their own reality, they are composites
From the logical standpoint they are
of matter and form (Ph. II l,192b8-193bl8).
composites of genera-and species and subject, or, in the special terminology of
Their
the Categories (5,2all-19), of secondary substance and primary substance.
accidents may, for present purposes, be left out of consideration.
So far, then, everything is in order in these two initial assertions of the
Physics.
From the two premises, however, a rather surprising conclusion is
drawn: 5 Lb bf. rwv x.a86A.ou hcf. ru xa.8' ax.a.<H<X od npoUv cu . 4
An unalerted
reader would be inclined th understand this in English ae ''Therefore one should
proceed from the universal to the particulars," or "to the individuals." The
meaning would in this perspective be that one knows the universal first, and
from the universal proceeds to knowledge of the individual or particular sensible
thing.
Such an understanding of the sentence, of course, strikes at once a
jarring note.
Elsewher\ Aristotle's noetic regularly sees all human knowledge
originating in the individual sensible things.
The universal seems only a further
and less definite way of considering things that are first known as individual.5
In the Posterior Analytics (I 2,72a4-5) the universal is explicitly described as
farthest from sensation, while the individuals, in direct contrast, are closesto
Even within the Platonic setting, Aristotle maintains that the proponents of the,
Ideas were actually going from "the things around us" (Metaph. A 9,990bl--0xford
tr.) to corresponding separate entities of the same name.
In an Aristotelian
context the notion of going from un.iversals to particulars hardly makes sense
As Tannery noted towards the end of the nineteenth century in his discussion of
this passage, one would expec from all the analogous passages that Aristotle
should say just the opposite. The Stagirite should find his point of departure
in the particular that is immediately attained in sensation, and proceed to the
general or the universal as his goal.
The particular things are first known,
and in them and through them the universal is reached.
One would expect to
read: "Therefore we must advance from the particular to the general."
Yet the
text clearly states the opposite.
It asserts that one should start with the
general or universal and proceed to the particular.
The direction the procedure has to take, accordingly, is stated unequivocally
in this text.
It is from universal to particular.
But exactly what is meant by
"universal" and "particulars" in the present setting?
Whatever they may mean, the
statement as a whole cannot very well against an Aristotelian �ackground imply
that human knowledge starts with non-sensible objects.
Procedure from universals
to concrete s 'nsible things would not be any more acceptable to Aristotle than
to Whitehead.
The first step in the investigation of the passage, therefore,
will be to determine exactly what is meant by "universal" and by "particulars"
in its context.
o
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O¹ £tU¹ tc¹ _a¹ x aU¹ ana¹ x¹ ta¹ ca¹ UUqc9¹ C¹ ?rxt¹
UUx¹ x¹ U°¹ UcU¹ Ux®¹ U¹ qcbUxxa I¬o_¹  ¹ qaaU¹
ZuUUZa¹ o¹ U¹ txq Rtaa¤xqt ¹ ¹ ta¹ ZZac¹ ¤tc¹ SxZaa_ ¹ Ktxx¶
¹ tU_¹ _xxqxta_¹ x¹ bUxq¹ tba¹ o ¹ ta¹ x U°¹ aa¹ oxaU¹
U_¹ qx a¹ x¹ ta¹ xqxnxZUx¹ p¹ U¹ x_aa xUa¹ UxZU¹ ZZax¹ 2¹
=xµ¹ C_¹ ;x¹ +-1U. ¹ Ua¹ uU¹ x¹ x¹ ta¹ Uxq¹ x¹ n¹ ¤a_qc¹
Ux¹ a¹ X¹ ¤xt¹ aZxo°xq¹ ta¹ aa¹ U_¹ ¥xt¹ qxxq¹ ta¹ xUZc¹
¹ ,-1 ¹ Ua¹ tU¹ x¹ vx¹
o¹ tx¹ aUxq¹
Nsd¹ ;xa¹
UUqa¹ ta¹ c ¹ x¹ ¹ c_¹ x¹ x¹ U¹ <xaxU¹ aUxq ¹ Bc¹ a¬Ux5¹
Ota¹ coccZc¹ ¹ Xa¹ ¹ ¹  x aU¹ ZZax a_¹ xc¹ ZaU°¹ x¹ x¹ e¹
Uf¹ X¹ ¹ tU¹ Uqa¹ x¹ §a_qa¹ x¹ ¤txZt¹ U¹ X}aZ¹ x¹ ¤¹ X°¹ aZax¹
¹ a¹  a¹ qaaU¹ ZtUUZcxxZ¹ aq¹ ¹ Xa¹ U¹ Ux U ¹ Xana¹ x¹ x¹
¤¹ ¤tU¹ x¹ aZxoxZ¹ ZtUUZaxxZ¹ x¹ aq¹ ¤tata¹ x¹ x¹ U¹ ta¹ ¹ U¹
Z¦ ¹ Otxl¹ §_¹ aU¹ tU¹ ta¹ a¹ Ua¹ n¹ ta¹ x cU¹ y¹ aZxoxZ¹
¤tza¹ U¹ qa¹ x¹ xaU¹ x¹ Uta¹ U_¹ ¹ U¹ aa¹ o¹ ta¹ a ¹
=¹ x¹ ;xa¹ _a¹ ¹ Ut¹ tUa¹ x¹ nUZ¹ U¹  Xa¹ n¹ _xooac¹ xqxox·
ZUx9¹ C¹ _a¹ ¹ aa¹ ¹ Xc¹ ZtUV[axµa_¹ X°¹ tx ¹ U°¤tac¹ x¹ tx¹ ¤U°¹
U¹ aU¹ c¬xZx°¹
C¹ x¹ ¹ xa_¹ x¹ =¸¹ o¹ ta¹
U q¹ tc¹
x¹ tU¹ U°¹ x¹ aUxq¹ C¹ x¹ axa_¹ taa¹ U¹ a¹ o¹ ta¹ Ux¹
ac¹ n¨wh¹ U a°¹ UW¹ ZUxxq¹ U°¹ txq¹ Y°Xcxq¹ a_xZU7a_¹  
aUZt¹ U_¹ ¤txa¹ U¹ QFx¹¹ Y°¹ Xaxq]¹ta ¹ U¹ aT´aU°¹/2 2 1* 2 2  
 #$%  !%      ( 2  D&\^L¡*/)'*+X+'+) ¹


C¹ aa ¹ qxa¹ ta¹ U¹ n¹ a¹ o¹ ta¹ _coxxa¹ aa¹ n¹ ¤ta¹ U¹ tqt¹
x¹ xco¹ tU_¹ °¹ a¹ aUxq¹ Ota¹ aUxq¹ x¹ tU¹ n¹  atxq¹ c_xZUa_¹  
U¹  Xc¹ o¹ xUZa¹  atxq¹ tU¹ aUx¹ x¹ ¤¹ aox_ax°¹ ¤txc¹
a¬xxq¹ x¹ U¹  Xa¹ n¹ _xooaa¹ txq¹ @ ¹ U¹ qxZU¹ xc©x¹ ta¹ xcU¹
x¹ aqU°¹ _cZxXc_¹ X°¹ tx¹ ZUZx°¹ ¹ Xc¹ a_xZUa_¹ o¹ X~aZ¹ @¹
xUZi¹ Y°¹ x aU¹ x¹ aU¹ tU¹ ¤txZt¹ x¹   Zt¹ U¹ Uc¹ U¹ ¹ Yc¹
a_xZUa_¹ o¹ U²¹ X~aZ¹ X° x_xx_U¹ tU¹ £txZt¹ x¹ ¹ t¹ a_xZUa_¹
J¹ :)1U+4,'8¹ I¬o_¹  !¹ ?¬U a¹ Ua¹ qxa6¹ Ot¹  U¹ x¹ U¹ x cU¹
>UxU¹ U¹ x_x x_U¹ xXx_ ¹
@ ¹  aUt°xZU¹ U_x¹ ta¹ ajZc¹
o¹ ta¹ x aU¹ x¹ U¹ Ux°¹ o¹ txq¹ aUx¹ x¹ _xxqxtxq¹ U¹ Ota¹
xaU¹ x¹ tU¹ ¤txZt¹ x¹ o¹ Zt¹ U¹ Ua¹ U¹ ¹ Ycq¹¹ U¹  Xa¹   txq¹
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Otqt¹ ta¹
ta¹ a ¹ ¤x¹ Xa¹ o_¹ a_¹ Zxa°¹ x¹ tx¹ c¹
cUxq¹ C¹ _a¹ ¹ aa ¹ ¹ a¬a¹ U¹ x¹ ªxt¹ U°¹ aa¹
C¹ UxZU¹ ta¹ xa¤¹ o¹ Et¹ Ktx¹ tU¹ ta¹ xaU¹ x¹ x¹ x U°¹
aa¹ aU¹ U¹ _aa xa_¹ U_¹ UxZUa_¹ Ua¹ Zt¹ U¹ tU¹ o¹ U¹ ¹ o¹
Ux U¹ _a¹ ¹ aa ¹ Z UxXa¹ ¤xt¹ tc¹ kUZtxq¹ n¹ ;xa¹ x¹ ta¹
C¹ =¹ H¹ )')'21U0*+ ¹ ta¹ x cU¹ ZaU°¹ aU¹ x¹ x¹
aqU¹ aa¹ x¹ ZtUUZaxµa_¹ U¹ x_ca xUc¹ %,2 $ &-2 "2 ')+ .2  ¹
C¹ =¹  )+3)'+2X/)(+4U, ¹ ta¹ x aU¹ x¹ _axa_¹ ta¹ UZUx°¹ tU¹ ¤_¹
Xa¹ axa_¹ ¹ Ua¹ x¹`co{|c¹ x¹ xao¹ ;¹ x U°¹ U_¹ U¹ cZ_U°¹ aa¹
Uq¹ taa¹ xa¹ _a¹ ¹ UaU¹ x¹ ta¹ c¹
;xc#¹
;ta¹ aUxq¹
ox¢alU¹ aZqxµa_¹ X°¹ Aaa¹
¤U¹ tU¹ o¹ ZUc¹ x¹ tc¹ %adm¹
tU¹ xp¹ tc¹ ZUa¹ ¤ca¹ _a¹ U¤U°¹ ¤xt¹ U¹ x¹ aoocZ¹ ¤_¹ taaX°¹ Uxw¹
Otx¹ ¤U¹ aU¹ ¹ c¬Ux¹ t«¹ tc¹ ZxaZa¹ o¹ ta¹ aUUa¹ XUZa¹ ¤U¹
xaU°¹ ta¹ ZxaZa¹ o¹ U¹ Xaxq$¹ C¹ XUx¹ ¹ o ¹ ;xc¹
aUxq¹ x aU¹ ©xt¹ ZUa¹ x¹ ta¹ axq¹ ZtUc¹ n¹ ta¹
=¹ x¹ x¹ tU_°¹ UxZUXa¹ x¹ ta¹ aa¹ Za¬¹ P¹
x¹ ta¹ a¬¹
o ¹ ta¹ ox¹ ZtUa¹ o¹ ta¹
_a¹ ¹ ana¹ ¹ U¹ ZUc¹ X¹ Uta¹
¹ aooaZ¹ o¹ ¤txZt¹ ta¹ ZUa¹ Ua¹ Xaxq¹ qt¹

;xcxU¹
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Nor does it seem helpful to distinguish from the usua1 aense of the universal
1
"the other and less frequent sense of 'concrete whole.'"
The universal, as
first known in the sensible things from which human cognition takes its origin,
is always a concrete whole.
It is "something composed of this particular
formula and this particular matter treated as universal" (Metaph. Z 10,1035b29-30),
"the compound of both taken universally"(ll,1037a6-7; Oxford tr.).
All the
universals that are predicated of sensible things will be composites or compounds
of this nature.
In its regularly used sense, accordingly, the universal ie a
"concrete whole."
Finally, what about Roes's suggestion that "universal" in the present text
means a generic nature, instead of the "true nature" of the universal that
1
appears in the specific characteristics�
At one place in the Metaphysics
(H l,1042al5) "universal," in the sense of specific nature, seems contrasted
with genus.
But does this imply that the generic universals are not universals
B 3,
in the true sense?
If the universals were principles, Aristotle (Metaph.
998bl7-19) argues, the highest genera would fill this role.
In Mure's trans
lation of the Posterior Analytics (II 19,100al6-b3), in fact, the specific
nature "man" is a "rudimentary universal,"
while the widest of the generic
natures are the "true universals": "for though the act of sense-perception
is of the particular, its content is universal--is man, for example9 not the
man Callias.
A fresh stand is made among these rudimentary universals, and
the process does not cease until the indivi,aible
concepts, the true universals,
are established: e.g. such and such a species of animal ia a step towards
the genus animal, which by the same process is a step towards a further
generalization."
In a note to the translation Mure states that the highest
genera, the categories, are "par excellence universal'' (n. 2).
Actually, in the Greek �ext, both the specific and the generic traits are
1
merely called "universal."
No adjective is added in either case to distinguish
what would be a "rudimentary" universal from a "true" universal.
Species and
genera alike seem regarded as universal in the full sense of the term. In the
above text from the Posterior Analytics, the specific nature that is perceived
in the individual man is the starting point of the process.
The next step
is the establishing of the genus "animal," and so on in ascending scale until
the highest genus is reached.
According to this way of regarding the process
of cognition, the object is first known in its specific nature and then
13
gradually in its more generic traits.
On the other hand, the Greek commentators
were inclined to interpret in the opposite direction the process signalized
The confused object initially known
in the opening chapter of the Physics.
appeared in its more generic traits, as an object at a distance will first
appear as a body, then as something alive, and then as a man.
In either case,
however, the notion of universality seems to be fully satisfied.
Both the
generic and the specific natures are predicated of subjects and belong in
these subjects as identical with each of them.
What, then, is the exact sense of "universal" in the opening passage of the
Physics?
The context describes it as a "whole,"
a whole that contains a
number of things as its parts.
In it these parts are confused (�Y¥KEX�1{'�>.
What are these parts?
Whatever they are, they will function as the 1(0t-rl'el(
01�ioi.
towards which the process of knowledge advances.
If what is meant by parts
in thie context can be determined with satisfactory clearness, they
should
allow one to see the nature of the concretion formed by them.
They should
provide the key to the meaning of the universal as the notion is
found used
in the present passage.
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P.

are more kn o w abl e in the mse lve s but are not
natural philosophy these
form received by

it.

are found

The matter and the

as genus and

differentia are in

In

formless matter and the first

form are contained in the sensible

things that human cognition first knows.
thing,

immediately knowable to men.

to be entirely
They

are fused together in the sensible

the definition.

From a study

of the

originally known concrete whole they are reached and expressed in separate
notions through the procedure of natural philosophy.
actuation of the matter, moreover,
genus

H

(Metaph.

6,1045a23-35).

as the form is the

of definition into genus and

The analysis

differentia is in fact used in the

Just

diff eren tia the actuation of the

eo is the

Metaphysics

(Z 12,1037b8-1038a35)

as an

approach to the study of the composition of matter and form in sensible substances,

characterized

(b9-10)

a nd the p roble m dealt with in their

regard is

for the inquiries about substance.

In the meaning of a concrete whole analyzed

as helpful

into its logical elements, therefore, the illustration of the word and the
definition i.s

quite what should be expected in Aristotle as an approach to

the analysis of a physical

whole into elements or principles or causes.

(Aristotle's Physics, pp.

Rose

457-458),

interpretation "seems impossible."
had identified the "universal" in
instance

the

however, states that this

Ross, it will be remembered (supra, P•

2),

this context as generic knowledge, for

knowledge of something as an "animal."

The procedure, then,

would be from the general characteristic as the starting point to the specific
traits as the principles or elements, for example from "animal" to "horse" or
"cow."

this understanding of the

In

elements reached by the

procedure, the genus cannot be one of the

scientific inquiry.

expressly contrasted with the elements

As the

starting point,

that are reached as a goal.

it is
Hence it

seems impossible for the elements in this illustration to be the genus and
the differentia that make up the definition.
What alternative
of a genus into
of definition�

does Ross

offer?

He acknowledges (ibid.)

but rather of logical analysis.
the

of the
(p.

generic nature of an

458).

even remotely,

the transition from the recognition

object to the recognition of its specific nature"

"Circle" in Aristotle is in

fact an ambiguous terme

geometrical circle it is also used for an epic cycle (APo.
had still other meanings in everyday speech.
suggestion that the

the present purpose,

only interpretation able "to illustrate,

what is is put forward as illustrating, viz.

analysis

But, Ross claims, the distinguish

ing of the various senses of an ambiguous term will serve
and will provide

that the

That is not at all the business

its species will not do here.

k��·{K°"'""

I

Tannery•s--ri' rt.

Besides a

12,77b33), and
cite, P• 4719 n.5 )

distinguished by the definition are the

circumference of the circle and the surface

limited by the circumference, both

referred to indifferently in Greek mathematics by the word "circle," seems to
be in essentials the same as that of Ross.
There need be little question about the remote way in which this interpretation
would allow the illustration to function.
about the ambiguous use of terms.

There is no immediate problem hara

Where such a problem has an essential

bearing upon his theme, Aristotle is usually not
fore.

slow in bringing it to the

To use definition as an illustration, and without any warning understand

by it solely the definition of ambiguous terms, does seem farfetched.

It is

not paralleled in Aristotle's use of the analysis of definition in the
Metaphysics (Z 12) as an approach to the analysis of sensible things into
matter and form.

Moreover, the definition of an ambiguous term, insofar as

it can have a definition9

does not in fact distinguish its various senses,

any more than the definition of a genus distinguishes its different species.
A definition of "healthy," or "medical," or "good," would merely provide a
vague description that could extend to all the various

senses.

It would not

distinguish the meaning that"healthy"has when applied to food from the meaning
it has when

applied to color.

One may reject, correctly,

interpreting the illustration in the
species;

the possibility of

sense of the division of a genus into its

but by the same token a division into the various meanings of an

ambiguous term becomes inapplicable.

P.

The second

6

illuetration is that

children at first call all men fathers

and all women mothers, and only later distinguish

t he

one

from the

other.

The

relation,of the one to the other,parallels the relation between the components
of a definition in the first illustration. "Man" and"woman" are more general,

"father" and "mother"

are more specific.

Does the

illustration mean, however9

that a child commences with a specific knowledge of his father as father, and

wrongly applies that knowledge i n its fullness to men in general?

century Greek children may have been precocious.

impr essions with full specific knowledge of what it means
somewhat beyond the bounds of credibility.

Fourth

But to credit their first
to be a father, is

Does the illustration mean,

then,

that they first h ave the general impression of "man," express this incorrectly

by the word "father," and only later get the spe cific notion to which the

word "father " is restricted?

In the rout simile at the end of the

Posterior Analytics

(II

19,lOObl-3),

the procedure of human knowledge is clearly taken to be from the specific
nature "man" through the generic nature "animal" to still higher genera, until
the highest genus of all,

is reached.

the category,

In one of a number of

indiscriminate singulars that appear before human sensation the notion "man"
is grasped, and then the other singulars are aligned with it one after another
until the species is sufficiently established.

Further,

panorama with horses, cows, dogs, cats, and so on,
the genus "animal"

is reached.

men are viewed in a

and in a corresponding way

Animals are viewed along with plants in a still

wider picture, and the notion "something living" is attained as a broader generic

nature.

The procees continues until the

hig h est genus, "substance," is isolated.

Thie ia the way the Porphyrian tree has been climbed by generations of students

�

of Aristotelian logic from Boethius on.

On
he other hand, the familiar
1
illustration used by the Greek commentators
went in the opposite direction.
In seeing a distant object, one recognized it first asabody;then on getting

cloeer to it one saw that it was

something alive, on still greater proximity

that it was a man, and finally that it was the individual Socrates or Alcibiades.
The direction was from genera to species and singulars.
Each of the two ways of proceeding seems to have its legitimate place.

the logician's viewpoint, the singulars are first grouped into species,
the

species into genera, until the highest genus is reached.

From

and then

Epistemologically9

however, a thing seems known first under the vaguest general notion of "something,"

and then distinguishing traits are gradually seen in it,
object first perceived at a distance.
here?

Or are both on the same footing,

as in the case of the

Which of the two viewpoints is applicable
as far as the present illustration is

concerned?
c.

The text reads as though "the one and the other" or "each of the two"

(£1'�TEf<>V )

into which the originally known confused whole is distinguished

must be "men and fathers" or "women and mothers."

Neither the more specific

notion "fathers" nor the more generic notion "men" seems to be the concrete
whole that is first known.
each other, the

/t'ot\)'£/(�cr�

They seem represented as concepts distinct from
that emerge from a differentiating

the objects initially grasped through sensation.

knowledge of

The starting point is neither

the one nor the other as distinct notions, but rather a vague object in which
both are fused and neither is differentiated.

Whether the child first becomes

accustomed to call the vaguely known object "Dad" or "man" or an y other name�
beside the point.

It is known first as a confused whole, and only later are

is

the concepts of it as "father" and as "man" differentiated.
Interpreted in this way, the second illustration continues to press home the
The
are the distinct generic and specific

point made by the first.

l(o,;iJ•/ic-.""T«

notions that were not differentiated in the initially known whole.

l(�Vl-'e���T�

here cannot mean singular sensible things, but universal notions that set up the
species and genera.

The confusedly known object that serves as the starting

P. 7

point is, however,

universal in regard to

them all.

It contains them by being

predicable of each, for each of the components is a "known object" or "something,"

or whatever one wishes to call the initially grasped whole in all ite vagueness.
With each of them is it identical, one by one,

while remaining a unitary notion
In this way it fully and univocally satisfies the Aristotelian
requirements for universality, namely "as containing many things by being
predicated of each, and9 while a unit, by being them all severally"(Metaph. A 26,
in itselfo

The starting point, accordingly, is neither the
1023b30-31; supra, p. 2).
lowest species nor the highest genus, but an as yet undifferentiated object

that ie universal to both.
universal," and the genera,

It may therefore be referred to simply as "the

differentiae,

called without hesitation its

and species contained under it be

K<:l"'rK o<rTo\

IV
What Aristotle has been saying,

then9

is that the confused object initially

known in sensation is universal in regard to its parts or components, and that

from it one proceeds to the distinct knowledge of the components.
what he says.

But what does it mean,

philosophically,

That is

in the present context?

Sometimes one can determine satisfactorily enough what a Greek thinker is

saying,

meaning.

and still encounter difficulty in assessing ite correct philosophical
In the opening chapter of the Physics, what is the exact bearing of

the statement that one must proceed from the universals to their distinct
components?

It is brought forward as an introduction to a natural philosophy

that proceeds from concrete sensible things to the matter and form that are
the principles or causes or elements of these things.
Is it merely a comparison?
Does it just mean that as in the

its parts,

case of a universal you analyze a whole into

so in natural philosophy you analyze the initially known s�nsible

concretion into its distinct components? Possibly.
There are, however,

aome difficulties in accepting this view,

it may appear at first sight.

its components is not introduced as a comparison,
is introduced by

plausible as

The notion of proceeding from the universal to

6 t6--wherefore.

have to proceed from universaleD

but as a consequence.

Because we first know concretions,

we

It

Such seems to be the sequence of thought.

It appears to mean that the concretions from which the procedure of natural

philosophy commences will somehow remain universal in regard to their principles

and elements.

Hence would arise the necessity of the elaborate explanation

Secondly,

the principles reached by the procedure in natural philosophy

through the examples of the name and the definition,
and the men and women.

the fathers and mothers

have to be in themselves more knowable than the concretions from which the

procedure started.

This requirement is stated expressly in the opening

chapter of the Physics.

The principles reached by the procedure are formless

matter and its firet form.

Z 10,1036a8-9).

But in itself the matter is unknowable

(Metaph.

As a principle for scientific knowledge of sensible things

it will have to appear in a way that renders it more knowable than the

observable things themselves.
in the singular thing,

This cannot be the way in which it ie present

�

where, taken ap 0t from the form, it manifests no
actuality or determination whatsoever.
Yet it is knowable by analogy
(Ph. I 7,191a7-12).
As the bronze is to the statue and the wood to the bed9
so is it to the substantial actuality of any body.

What does this mean?

means that the basic concept upon which the concept of formless matter is
elaborated, is the concept of a body,

It

of the concretion originally known in

In
It is the universal and vague concept of something corporeal.
this way the subject that rec�ives the substantial form is represented as a
sensation.

8

P.

corporeal substrate that lacks all the determinations given by the categories.
The notion is formed by taking the universal concept of "substrate" as seen in
and by adding to the concept the negation of any

things like a bed or a statue,
formal determination.

In this way it remains basically the concept of a body,

the concept of the concretion that was first known in sensation.
it the concept of the concretion remains universal.
bodies is conceived as something corporeal.

���·fl(lil.rr� that

come under this universal,

of a universal.
ledge.

In regard to

The basic substrate of

But it itself,

as one of the

is likewise represented in the status

As universal it can serve as a principle for scientific know

It can be used universally as a principle for understanding all bodies.

Accordingly it is more knowable in itself than the bodies it serves to explain,
even though these bodies are
The same

more

knowable to us.

considerations hold correspondingly for the formal

sensible things.

It cannot be

contrasted with matt�r,

represented just in itself.

principle of

Even though it is

it has to be represented as something material.

shape of a statue is related

to the bronze and the shape

As the

of a bed to the wood,

so the intelligible content of a substance is represented in relation to the
formless matter that multiplies it in the many individuals of a species.
concept is basically that of a shaped or formed body9
substrate added aa its distinguishing feature.
corporeal remains basic to it.

The

with the negation of all

The concept of something

The vague notion of the object originally

known in sensation remains universal to it.
Viewed in this perspectiv�,

both the principles that are reached by the

analysis of sensible things in natural philosophy come under the object
initially known in sensation, aa under a universalo

Aristotle is saying that

the procedure of natural philosophy is from bodies as known universally in
ordinary sensation to principles that are conceived and known under further
determinations of the original universal concept.

One is proceeding from the

first known universal to a distinct cognition of notions that come under it
but are as yet undifferentiated in it, somewhat as the definition of a circle
differentiates the notions signified confusedly by the word "circle," and
children afterwards distinguish the notions of "father" and "man" that were
undifferentiated in their earlier concept.
this interpretation is correct9

What Aristotle has in mind,

sensation remains universal in regard to all further knowledge.
of all human knowledge

if

is that the confused object first grasped in
The origin

in sensation would mean that all other objects have

to be known basically in terms of concrete sensible things, with the necessary
refinements and negations added.

Thia would safeguard the Aristotelian

conception of scientific knowledge from any atomism in the epistemological
sense.

The ultimate principles reached by the scientific procedure do not

have to be given the status of individually known building-blocks from which
the universe is constructed.

Rather,

any "correspondence theory" of truth

that one might wish to attribute to Aristotle would have to refrain carefully
from placing a photographic correspondence between the ultimate principles
themselves and the concepts by which they are known.
at all immediate replicas of them,

The concepts are not

but are elaborations of the confused object

originally known in sensation and contained under it as under a universal.

v
The above interpretation gives the "universal" in the opening passage of
the Physics the regular and univocal meaning that it has elsewhere in Aristotle.

It also finds considerable importance in the use of the notion for the
explanation of philosophical procedure at the beginning of natural philosophy,
an importance that justifies the amount of space given it in the condensed
summary of scientific method.
The interpretation, it may be objected, uses
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